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PROMOTING JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE AND
USE OF LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP
Lawrence A. Frolik*
I. INTRODUCTION
Guardianship comes within the special province of judges.' In
the great majority of guardianship hearings, there is no jury.2 The
presiding judge is the sole arbiter of whether the alleged
incapacitated person meets the legal standard of mental
incapacity and whether that person would benefit from the
appointment of a guardian.' If a guardian is appointed, the judge
determines the type and extent of the powers granted to the
guardian.4 Of course, the judge is not simply free to follow his or
her own instincts or desires, for the judge is bound to determine
the facts carefully and apply the law faithfully. Still, as the
saying has it, "reasonable persons can disagree," and the judge
has some latitude in how he or she responds to the facts and
circumstances that arise during the guardianship hearing.
Within that zone of discretion, the judge may have a range or set
of choices, any of which is defensible on legal and ethical grounds.
No matter which course of action the judge takes, his or her

*

© 2002, Lawrence A. Frolik. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, University of

Pittsburgh School of Law. BA., University of Nebraska, 1966; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1969; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1972. I want to extend special thanks to Frank Johns
for his insights, comments and encouragement, to Melanie Irwin for her research efforts,
and to the many judges, lawyers, and academics who over the years have enriched my
understanding of guardianship.
1. Mark D. Andrews, Student Author, The Elderly in Guardianship:A Crisis of
ConstitutionalProportions,5 Elder L.J. 75, 99 (1997).
2. Id.
3. Id. Andrews also discusses the guardianship process from beginning to end,
including the lack of due process rights. Id. at 86-111.
4. E.g. Fla. Stat. § 744.344(1) (2001) (directing the court to characterize the
guardianship as either plenary or limited and, if limited, to specify the rights that have
been removed); N.Y. Mental Hyg. Laws § 81.02(a)(2) (McKinney 1996) (directing the court
to grant to the guardian only those powers that are necessary, based on the court's
evaluation of necessity); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2111.50(A)(2) (Anderson 1998) (granting
the court discretion over the extent of power granted to the guardian).
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decision is unlikely to be overturned on appeal.' How, then, does
a judge decide what to do? Put another way, what motivates a
judge who presides at a guardianship hearing and how do those
motivations translate into judicial action?
II. WHY DO JUDGES RULE AS THEY DO?
Judges naturally want to do what is right, that is, what is
legally correct, but they also want to do what will be best for the
incapacitated person. Like most people, judges want to do what is
"good."6 Describing what is "good," however, is not easy. One way
to begin is to consider what one may expect judges do not want to
do. For one, judges do not want to appoint guardians for
individuals who have sufficient mental capacity to handle their
own affairs, nor do they want to appoint incompetent, corrupt, or
uncaring individuals or institutions as guardians. Judges do not
want to resort to guardianship if a less intrusive alternative
exists. For example, if an individual is well served by durable
powers of attorney and property-management devices such as a
revocable trust and joint bank accounts, a judge might well
conclude that, despite the individual's incapacity, no

guardianship is necessary.!
Naturally, the foremost imperative for a judge presented
with a guardianship petition is the welfare of the alleged
incapacitated person. Protecting the person and the property of
an adjudicated incompetent is the fundamental justification for

the existence of guardianship.! So, above all, one may expect that
5. E.g. Estate of Haertsch, 649 A.2d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. 1994) (holding that "[tihe
selection of a guardian for a person adjudicated incapacitated lies within the discretion of
the trial court whose decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.").
6. Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 55, 66-67 (2001) (discussing how the ethical decision-maker becomes aware
of what is good or right and uses it to make his decisions).
7. E.g. In re Hodges, 756 A.2d 389, 393 (D.C. 2000) (the individual was mentally ill,
but a guardian was not necessary); see In re Guardianshipof Fuqua, 646 S.2d 795, 796
(Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1994) (the individual was totally incapacitated, but the lower court
should have considered a less restrictive alternative to total guardianship); Guardianship
of Collier, 653 A.2d 898, 902 (Me. 1995) (the individual was severely mentally
incapacitated, but there was evidence that he was still capable of handling his own affairs;
thus, the lower court should have considered a less restrictive alternative, such as
independent living in the community with supervision by mental-health providers without
a guardian).
8. Jamie L. Leary, Student Author, A Review of Two Recently Reformed
GuardianshipStatutes: Balancing the Need to Protect Individuals Who Cannot Protect
Themselves against the Need to GuardIndividualAutonomy, 5 Va. J. Soc. Policy & L. 245,
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judges want to make decisions and craft orders that promote the
interests of the incapacitated person. Translating this basic and
unarguable maxim into specific acts for particular individuals,
however, is not automatic or formulaic. Because each individual's
needs are different and the range of possible solutions will vary
from case to case, judges must create individualized solutions.9
That is, judges are not like baseball umpires, calling strikes and
balls or merely labeling someone competent or incompetent.
Rather, the better analogy is that of a craftsman who carves
staffs from tree branches. Although the end result - a wood staff
is similar, the process of creation is distinct to each staff. Just
as the good wood-carver knows that within each tree branch there
is a unique staff that can be "released" by the acts of the carver,
so too a good judge understands that, within the facts
surrounding each guardianship petition, there is an outcome that
will best serve the needs of the incapacitated person, if only the
judge and the litigants can find it.
After assuring themselves that they have met the needs of
the incapacitated person, judges also may attempt to address the
concerns of the other parties represented at the guardianship
hearing. The judge can satisfy the petitioner's request by finding
the alleged incapacitated person to be legally incompetent and
appointing as guardian the individual or institution requested by
the petitioner. In most guardianship hearings, various family
members will be present and may testify.' Although the judge
owes no duty to the family, most judges understandably want to
assuage the family trepidations 1 about the well-being of the
incapacitated person. Representatives of social-service agencies
that work with the elderly may also appear, and, as with family
concerns, the judge may try to fashion a solution that meets the
legitimate concerns of social-service providers. Of course,
249-250 (1997) (discussing the purposes of guardianship).
9. Norman Fell, Guardianship and the Elderly: Oversight Not Overlooked, 25 U.
Toledo L. Rev. 189, 192 (1994) (asserting that because the circumstances of each case are
unique, the judge must consider each guardianship case differently).
10. Andrews, supra n. 1, at 103.
11. E.g. In re Estate of Salley, 742 S.2d 268, 271 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1997) (the family
had genuine objections to the choice of guardian and should have received notice and an
opportunity to be heard); In re GuardianshipofBraaten,502 N.W.2d 512, 513 (N.D. 1993)
(the family was concerned that proper medical treatment was being avoided and
nutritional needs were being neglected); In re Guardianshipof K, 2001 Wis. App. LEXIS
240 at 4:6 (Wis. Dist. App. 4th Mar. 8, 2001) (the family disagreed with the choice of

guardian).
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balancing the interests of all the parties may not always be
possible. If not, the interests of the incapacitated person should
take precedence.'
There is yet another limit on a judge's ability to meet all the
interests of the parties as well as properly serve the need of the
incapacitated person: the applicable statutory and common law.
As much as judges might prefer to have a generalized power to do
'Justice," in reality their choices are limited by the state
guardianship statute and case law. In almost all states, the most
elemental restriction of guardianship law is that judges lack the
power to initiate guardianship hearings. 3 All guardianship
statutes require someone to file a guardianship petition.'4 After a
petition has been filed, the judge's choice of action is constrained
by the state guardianship statute. Still, once a petition has been
filed, judges have a great deal of discretion because state
guardianship statutes rarely force them to act in a way that they
might think would be detrimental to the interests of the
incapacitated person.'
The discretion afforded to judges permits them to attempt to
implement the spirit and intent of the law rather than being
bound to enforce the inflexible letter of the law. Historically,
guardianship law was intended to protect an incapacitated
individual's person and property. 6 Guardianship was a way in
which society, acting through the courts, could assist and protect
those whose mental infirmaries left them unable to fend for
themselves. This was guardianship as benefice, or as an aspect of
12. E.g. Ind. Code Ann. § 29-3-5-5(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2001) (granting the court
discretion in choosing the guardian according to the incapacitated person's best interests);
N.Y. Mental Hyg. Laws § 81.01 (declaring the legislature's intent to create a guardianship
system that satisfies the needs of the incapacitated person while affording the greatest
amount of independence and self-determination); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 880.33(5) (West 1991 &
Supp. 2001) (mandating that the best interest of the incapacitated person prevail over
opinions of the family to the contrary).
13. Andrews, supra n. 1, at 86. In a departure from the traditional prohibition of the
courts from initiating a guardianship, Texas law permits a court, when it has probable
cause to believe that an individual is mentally incapacitated, to appoint a guardian ad
litem or court investigator to investigate and if necessary file an application for
guardianship. The court also is granted the right to obtain information to help it establish
probable cause. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 683 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
14. E.g. Fla. Stat. § 744.3201(1) (2001); Ind. Code Ann. § 29-3-5-1 (West 1994); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2111.03 (Anderson 1998).
15. E.g. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Laws § 81.01. As observed in supra note 12, the stated
purpose of the guardianship act is to promote the best interests of incapacitated people.
16. Andrews, supran. 1, at 79.
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the therapeutic state.' Also, by appointing a guardian, the court
created a responsible legal surrogate actor for the incapacitated
person so that he or she could participate in those aspects of life
subject to law, such as managing financial affairs and consenting
to medical treatment. 8 This aspect of guardianship as a
necessary component of a legal system presupposed that all
actors were capable of reasoned choice or, if not, a surrogate
would act on their behalf.
Until the wave of guardianship reform in the 1980s and
1990s, these therapeutic and legalistic aspects of guardianship
not only provided its justification, but also were the guideposts
for judges who ruled on guardianship matters. However, the
guardianship-reform movement of the 1980s interjected new
values into guardianship. Far from seeing guardianship as a
benevolent act by the state, reformers claimed that guardianship
was a massive intrusion upon the autonomy and independence of
those adjudicated incompetent and in need of a guardian. 9 In the
eyes of some, guardianship ceased to be a solution and became
the problem." Just as mental-health laws and practices relied
excessively on commitment to mental-health facilities, according
to its critics, so also the guardianship system was too dependent
on plenary guardianship and failed to seek a "less restrictive
alternative."2 '
Reformers offered many solutions to the excesses of
guardianship. Some were procedural and some were substantive,
but all reflected their suspicion, if not antagonism, to
guardianship.22 The procedural reforms, such as better notice to

17. Barbara A. Venesy, 1990 Guardianship Law Safeguards Personal Rights Yet
Protects Vulnerable Elderly, 24 Akron L. Rev. 161, 166 (1990) (explaining the therapeutic
or functional approach, in which guardianship is intended to safeguard against a person's
functional deficiencies in activities of daily living).
18. Sally Balch Hurme, Current Trends in GuardianshipReform, 7 Md. J. Contemp.
Leg. Issues 143, 143 (1995-1996) (defining the guardian's purpose).
19. Andrews, supran. 1, at 76-77.
20. Id. at 82.
21. Fell, supran. 9, at 200-201.
22. See generally John E. Donaldson, Reform ofAdult GuardianshipLaw, 32 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 1273 (1998) (analyzing guardianship reforms in Virginia during 1997 and 1998);
Kathleen Harris, Guardianship Reform, 79 Mich. B.J. 1658 (2000) (reporting on
guardianship reforms in Michigan from the 1970s through 2000); Neil B. Posner, Student
Author, The End of ParensPatriaein New York: Guardianshipunder New Mental Hygiene
Law Article 81, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 603, 610-645 (1996) (analyzing the 1992 guardianship
reform in New York, including a comparison to guardianship reforms in the 1970s).
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the alleged incapacitated person of the hearing, 23 were both an
attempt to ensure fairness and were meant also to discourage the
filing of guardianship petitions. By making the process more
costly and more time-consuming, reformers hoped to decrease the
number of plenary guardianships. If nothing else, reformers
hoped that the procedural changes would reduce the number of
false positives, i.e., reduce the number of approved guardians in
cases in which the alleged incapacitated person was not mentally
incapacitated as defined in the state statute. The substantive
changes, which included modifying the statutory definition of the
degree of mental incapacity necessary to warrant the appointment of a guardian,24 were overtly directed at reducing the
number of persons for whom a guardian could be appointed.
Finally, for cases in which guardianship could not be avoided, the
reformers created the concept of a "limited guardianship" that
would maximize the incapacitated person's autonomy and

23. E.g. 20 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5511 (West Supp. 2001). The statute contains the
following passage on notice of the guardianship hearing:
Written notice of the petition and hearing shall be given in large type and in
simple language to the alleged incapacitated person. The notice shall indicate the
purpose and seriousness of the proceeding and the rights that can be lost as a
result of the proceeding. It shall include the date, time, and place of the hearing
and an explanation of all rights, including the right to request the appointment of
counsel and to have counsel appointed if the court deems it appropriate and the
rights to have such counsel paid for if it cannot be afforded. The Supreme Court
shall establish a uniform citation for this purpose. A copy of the petition shall be
attached. Personal service shall be made on the alleged incapacitated person, and
the contents and terms of the petition shall be explained to the maximum extent
possible in language and terms the individual is most likely to understand. Service
shall be no less than 20 days in advance of the hearing.
Id.
24. For example, compare the change in Pennsylvania law that appeared to narrow
the statutory definition of a person in need of a guardian. In 1975, the statute read:
"Incompetent" means a person who, because of infirmities of old age, mental
illness, mental deficiency or retardation, drug addiction or inebriety: (1) is unable
to manage his property, or is liable to dissipate it or become the victim of designing
persons; or (2) lacks sufficient capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning his person.
20 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5501 (West 1975). By 2001, the threshold of incapacity seems to
have been raised:
"Incapacitated person" means an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate
information effectively and communicate decisions in any way is impaired to such
a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his financial
resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health and safety.
20 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5501 (West Supp. 2001).
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independence. 6
Today, limited guardianship is almost always an option for
someone in need of a guardian.26 Yet it is rarely invoked. If
judges sincerely desire to implement both the letter and the spirit
of the law - and there is no reason to doubt that this is true why is it that they so infrequently appoint limited guardians? It
is not because they are necessarily hostile to the concept (though
some may be). There is no reason to believe that judges harbor an
instinct distrust of limited guardianship. Rather, the very
circumscribed use of limited guardianship suggests either that it
is undesirable -

that idea is explored later in this Article -

or

that structural aspects of guardianship help explain the
continued judicial preference for plenary guardianship.28 Judges
apparently prefer plenary guardianship because it seems best to
meet the needs of the incapacitated person while still conforming
to other legitimate pressures of the legal system.29 Perhaps, in a
perfect world, only the needs of the incapacitated person would be
considered. In such a world, limited guardianship would almost
certainly be much more common. In the actual world, however,
the needs of the incapacitated person, although paramount, are
not the only judicial concern.
Solving the problem that the petitioner presents to the court,
and doing so within the limits of the law, is perhaps the most
basic judicial reaction to a guardianship petition. Although a few
such petitions may be fraudulent or frivolous because the alleged
incapacitated person is not incapacitated and has no need of a
guardian, in the main, the filing of a guardianship petition is the
result of something amiss, some problem that the petitioner
believes can be solved best or only by the appointment of a
guardian. If the petitioner can convince the judge of the reality of
the problem, then, within the limitations of the law, the judge
will want to solve, or at least ameliorate, the problem.
25. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship:An Analysis, a Critique, and a
Proposalfor Reform, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 599, 652-660 (1981) (advocating the need for limited
guardianship and the abolition of plenary guardianship); Sally Balch Hurme, Limited
Guardianship:Its Implementation Is Long Overdue, 28 Clearinghouse Rev. 660, 661 (1994)
(noting that the purpose of limited guardianship is to promote the incapacitated person's
independence and self-determination); Leary, supra n. 8, at 259-269 (outlining the basic
goals of guardianship reform).
26. E.g. Cal. Prob. Code § 1860.5 (West 1991); Fla. Stat. §§ 744.1012, 744.344 (2001).
27. Hurme, supran. 25, at 663.
28. Fell, supran. 9, at 203.
29. Id.
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For example, suppose the petitioner, fifty year old Ben, files a
guardianship petition asking that he be named guardian for his
eighty-five year old, widowed mother Mary. The petition alleges
that Mary is suffering from the early stages of dementia and, as a
result, is very susceptible to phone-and-mail solicitations. In the
last six months, she has spent more than $7,000 (out of an annual
income of only $20,000) on sweepstakes, magazines, household
products, and the like, and even tickets for plays, although she
rarely leaves the house and never leaves to go to a play. She also
has pledged more than $3,000 to charitable solicitors. Ben has
asked his mother not to respond to phone or mail solicitations
and, though she has repeatedly agreed, she continues to buy,
subscribe, enter, and pledge.
Although Ben has Mary's durable power of attorney and is
also her representative payee for her Social Security benefits, she
still has access to her savings and checking accounts as well as
the monthly pension check that she receives. Ben requests that
he be named her guardian so that he can deny her access to her
checking or savings account and take control of her pension. He
also intends to get her an unlisted phone number and have her
mail sent to a mailbox to which only he has access. The medical
evidence supports Ben's contention that Mary suffers from mild
dementia which, over time, might or might not become more
severe. The only defense offered is that Mary, other than her
spending proclivities, is capable of handling her affairs.
Faced with these facts, a judge might well conclude that
plenary guardianship is in order and reject any suggestion of
limited guardianship. From the judicial perspective, plenary
guardianship has several attractions. It will solve the problem as
presented. Once Mary is a ward and Ben is her guardian, she will
no longer be able to waste her money. Because plenary
guardianship will both assuage Ben's concerns and enable him to
protect Mary and her money, it will have met the "solve the
problem" test. Next, plenary guardianship is expeditious.
Although not the primary concerns of judges, judges are
nonetheless cognizant of the desirability of timely and efficient
resolution of conflicts, which is one result of the imposition of
plenary guardianship. Plenary guardianship also offers cost
savings for the parties. Once a guardianship is created, it is
unlikely to create further litigation. Most guardians never return
to the court because their appointment provides them with
sufficient authority to deal with almost any contingency. To the
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extent that the court monitors the guardian, the task is rarely
complicated by questions as to whether the guardian exceeded his
or her authority. 0 Nor need the guardian return to the court to
ask for additional authority or for an interpretation as to the
extent of his or her authority.
The efficiency offered by plenary guardianship makes it very
attractive.3 2 It saves the time of the judges and the litigants and
therefore is less costly than limited guardianship, which might
require the guardian to return to the court for expanded powers if
the ward suffers a further decline in capacity. If Mary's condition
worsens, Ben can expand his control of her life without returning
to the court for additional power to protect her. The finality of
plenary guardianship, in the sense that it both solves the present
problem and is expansive enough to meet future problems, makes
it extremely appealing to petitioners and judges alike. Inconclusive, halfway measures or orders that need clarification or
amendment can mean additional hearings at a cost of the judge's
time and at added expense to the estate of the ward. Plenary
guardianship is also preferred by third parties who deal with the
guardian because they know that the guardian's authority is
broad enough to support his or her actions. For example, if Ben,
as guardian, asks Mary's bank to deny her access to her accounts,
the bank can do so without fear that Ben might have exceeded his
authority.
Judges are also mindful of the need to reach a decision and to
craft an order that will not be overturned on appeal. Although
there is nothing about plenary guardianship that renders it
immune to an appeal, when there is an appeal, in guardianship
what is typically challenged is the determination that the ward
was mentally incapacitated.3 3 Yet, in most guardianship hearings
the mental incapacity of the ward is not seriously at issue, 4 and
30. Frolik, supra n. 25, at 654.
31. Id.
32. Fell, supran. 9, at 203.
33. E.g. In re Guardianshipof Fuqua, 646 S.2d at 795 (the ward appealed the lower
court's finding of incapacitation).
34. See Computer Analysis Yields Portraitof Elderly Words, LA. Times A2 (Sept. 27,
1987) (reporting that, in a survey of 2,200 court cases dating back to 1980, judges
approved 97% of the petitions; 34% were approved without a doctor's opinion). Most
practitioners would agree that the rate of serious challenge to the issue of incapacity
remains low despite the reforms since 1987. However, there is scant hard data on this
topic due to "the dearth of research7 in the area of due process and guardianship
generally. Nancy Coleman, Issue Brief. Due Process (Nov. 30, 2001) (unpublished
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so there is little likelihood that the decision to appoint a plenary
guardian will be challenged. Sometimes parties appeal the
decision to name a particular party as guardian, arguing that
they would have been a better choice, 5 but they rarely challenge
the correctness of the finding that the ward was legally
incompetent. 6
Plenary guardianship, then, has many advantages: it solves
the problem presented to the court, it grants the petitioner's
request (thus that party would not appeal), it is broad and
flexible enough to meet future problems arising from the ward's
diminished capacity, it is not likely to be the source of additional
litigation, and it is not particularly susceptible to being
overturned on appeal. As the saying goes, '"What's not to like?"
Well for those of us who favor limited guardianship, the answer
is, "a lot." If examined in detail, limited guardianship has much to
offer potential wards and not at a cost that should give jurists
pause.
III.IS LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP BETTER FOR
INCAPACITATED PERSONS?
The most basic challenge to proponents of limited
guardianship is whether it is desirable for the incapacitated
person. Put another way, does limited guardianship meet the
needs of an incapacitated person better than plenary guardianship? The focus at this point is strictly on the ability of limited
guardianship to satisfy the needs of the incapacitated person, not
whether it is "best" for judges, guardians, petitioners and other
parties. If limited guardianship is inappropriate or unsuc-cessful
as to wards, then the inquiry ceases because it would be wrong to
promote the use of limited guardianship if it is less effective in
meeting the needs of the ward than is plenary guardianship. Only
after the ward's interests have been served as best as they can
should the inquiry shift to whether and how limited guardianship
can meet the interests of other parties, such as the petitioner or
the judge.

manuscript prepared for Wingspan - The Second National Guardianship Conference) (on
file with the Stetson Law Review).
35. E.g. In re Guardianshipof K, 2001 Wis. App. LEXIS 240 at *6.
36. One exception is if the ward has a durable power of attorney. Sometimes the agent
acting under such a power objects to the appointment of a plenary guardian, arguing that
because of the power of attorney, no guardian is needed.
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The operation of a guardianship should not be a compromise
designed to alleviate the concerns of the various parties, nor
should it be some utilitarian system with the goal of bringing the
greatest good to the greatest number. Guardianship may have
conflicting interests, but it has one primary goal: the protection
and advancement of the life and property of the incapacitated
person.37 If limited guardianship is not the optimal solution for
the incapacitated person, then it should not be used. But the
obverse is also true. If limited guardianship would be better for
the ward than plenary guardianship, it should be used
irrespective of its effect on other parties or the judge.
In determining the efficiency of limited guardianship, it is
necessary to begin with the nature or source of the individual's
incapacity. The mentally incapacitated may be categorized as the
old and demented, the mentally ill, and the mentally retarded. Of
course, any one person can be old and demented and retarded, or
old and demented and mentally ill, or retarded and mentally ill,
but most incapacitated persons fit only a single category if we
define "old and demented" very broadly to include stroke victims
and those who suffer from other mental incapacities commonly
associated with advanced age. A fourth possible category would
comprise those persons who have lost consciousness, either
permanently, temporarily, e.g., a coma, or who have lost
consciousness as they approach death. The fourth category need
not concern us, however, because such persons would appear to
be obvious candidates for a plenary guardian, as they have no
ability to act on their own behalf.
Individuals who are old and demented, mentally ill, or
mentally retarded, however, can retain some degree of mental
functioning and so raise the question of whether they might be
better served by limited guardianship rather than plenary
guardianship. For our purposes, the arguments that can be made
on behalf of limited guardianship for the non-elderly mentally ill
or mentally retarded are not relevant to the question of whether
limited guardianship is better for an older person with reduced
mental capacity, although the advocates of the mentally ill and
mentally retarded were some of the most aggressive advocates of
limited guardianship."8 Those interested in the elderly were much
37. E.g. Cal. Prob. Code § 1800; N.Y. Mental Hyg. Laws § 81.01; 20 Pa. Consol. Stat.
§ 5502 (West Supp. 2001).
38. E.g. Maureen A. Sanders & Kathryn Wissel, Student Authors, Limited
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less insistent about the need for limited guardianship. The
difference in the degree to which the advocacy groups were
interested in limited guardianship is easily explained. Advocates
of the mentally ill and mentally retarded perceived limited
guardianship as part and parcel of the drive to normalize life for
their clients. 9 Advocates of the mentally ill and mentally
retarded sought to deinstitutionalize the mentally-ill and
mentally-retarded populations." Following the doctrine of the
least restrictive alternative,4 advocates proposed to place
mentally-ill and mentally-retarded individuals in the community
in which they could live lives that were as "normal" as possible in
light of each individual's particular disability.
Advocates saw plenary guardianship, however, as completely
at odds with integrating the disabled individuals into the
community. Individuals under a plenary guardianship were
severely hobbled in their attempts to rejoin the community
because they could not handle their financial affairs, make a valid
contract, control their medical care, or even decide where to live.
Advocates of the mentally ill argued that their clients should lose
only such rights as were necessary to permit them to live in the
community.42 Otherwise, they should retain the fundamental
rights that were part and parcel of living in the community.
According to reformers, the state could not justify stripping the
mentally ill of their rights as autonomous individuals merely
because they had an illness.43
Guardianshipfor the Mentally Retarded, 8 N.M. L. Rev. 231 (1978) (advocating limited
guardianship for the mentally retarded in New Mexico as part of a national movement).
39. Frolik, supra n. 25, at 653 (describing how plenary guardianship can prevent the
mentally retarded from functioning to the limits of their abilities).
40. For articles discussing and advocating deinstitutionalization, see David L.
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and
ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1107 (1972); Stephen L. Mikochik, Advancing
Deinstitutionalization,65 N.D. L. Rev. 143 (1989); Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for
Liberty: The Case againstInvoluntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered,70 Cal. L.
Rev. 54 (1982).
41. Ralph Slovenko, The Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill Revisited, 24 Pacific L.J.
1107, 1113-1114 (1993) (discussing the theory of the least restrictive alternative).
42. Id. at 1111-1117 (relating the theory of the least restrictive alternative to the
emergence of community-based treatment of the mentally ill as an alternative to civil
commitment).
43. E.g. Danielle Priola, Student Author, Disability Law - Burden of Proof - An
Individual Challenging the Capacity of a Developmentally-Disabled Person to Make an
Independent DecisionBears the Burden of Proving by Clear and ConvincingEvidence that
the DisabledPersonHas the Specific Incapacity to Decide - In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 638
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Advocates of the mentally retarded not only emphasized the
need for the individual to retain personal rights if he or she were
truly to be a functioning member of the community, but also
made another compelling point. Retarded individuals, they
contended, had more potential than our society had envisioned.
These individuals, far from being candidates for a useless life,
hidden away in an impersonal institution, were unique
individuals with capabilities and possibilities like anyone else."
Hence, adoption of the Education for All Children Act45 brought
retarded and other developmentally-disabled children into the
mainstream of education. Reformers hoped similarly to bring
adult retarded individuals into the community." Plenary
guardianship, with its absolute labeling and stripping of rights,
was seen as a barrier to inclusion.4 7 To reformers, plenary
guardianship was not a solution, but rather a problem. Limited
guardianship, on the other hand, held the promise of crafting just
the degree of protection and assistance needed by the mentally ill
and mentally retarded."
Advocates for the mentally ill and mentally retarded were
correct about limited guardianship. It is adaptable for a ward
with fluctuating capacity, as well as for a ward whose capacity is
expanding but whose ability to care for himself or herself would
otherwise be diminished by the imposition of plenary
guardianship. Limited guardianship is the preferred paradigm for
an individual who suffers from diminished or situational
incapacity rather than the global incapacity that we associate, for
example, with persons with advanced dementia of the
Alzheimer's type.
But what of the elderly who are gradually (or even rapidly)
losing mental capacity due to dementia or other mental
disabilities? Although their desire, and that of their guardians, is
that they be active, autonomous individuals, the reality is that

A.2d 1274 (1994), 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 407, 409 (1995) (discussing the New Jersey
Supreme Court's view that a finding of mental incompetence does not necessitate an
absolute deprivation of rights).
44. William Christian, Student Author, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct and Individuals with Mental Retardation,73 Tex. L. Rev. 409, 410-411
(1994) (arguing that mentally retarded individuals have capabilities like anyone else).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
46. Christian, supran. 44, at 410.
47. Frolik, supran. 25, at 653.
48. Id.
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they are often stranded on an ever-shrinking island of capability
and capacity. There is no potential for autonomy; rather, there is
the need to protect their lives and property. Limited guardianship
seems a poor fit for someone in decline. Rather than a solution, it
seems only to assure that the parties must return to the court to
grant the guardian additional power as the ability of the ward to
handle his or her life continues its inevitable decline. Indeed,
seen in that light, limited guardianship seems almost a cruel joke
to play on the families and guardians of the incapacitated elderly.
It is a pernicious overstatement, however, to argue that the
elderly with decreasing capacity should be viewed no differently
than the elderly with global incapacity. Many older persons suffer
from limited or selective mental incapacity. Their incapacity, if
not permanent, is at least temporarily stable or, alternatively, is
in a very slow decline.49 In short, their profile is closer to that of a
retarded person. Some of these older persons are stroke victims."
Once stabilized, their mental condition is not likely to worsen
unless and until they have another stroke or other debilitating
illness or accident. They might, for example, have lost the ability
to speak, but they are otherwise capable of handling their own
affairs and would be mortified if labeled "mentally incapacitated"
and were to have a plenary guardian appointed for them. Others
will have dementia that is not progressive or that is advancing
only at a very slow rate.5 They, too, may be capable of handling
some of their personal affairs. Their incapacity is not global, but
situational or task specific. Perhaps they no longer have the
capacity to manage their investments, but they may still be able
to pay their bills and do their own shopping and may be expected
to do so for the foreseeable future.
True, they need help, but they need a limited guardian, not a
plenary guardian. For these older persons with reduced, but
stable, capacity, limited guardianship provides all the assistance
that they need while avoiding the excessive intrusion on their

49. Fell, supran. 9, at 192.
50. A stroke is defined as a heterogeneous group of vascular disorders that result in
brain injury. Daily functioning in the workplace, home, and community is often reduced
and many stroke patients are impaired in their ability to walk, see, and feel. Each year
about 750,000 Americans have a stroke and about 150,000 of them die. The Merck Manual
of Geriatrics397-398 (Mark H. Beers & Robert Berkow eds., 3d ed., Merck Research Labs.

2000).
51. Dementia is a deterioration of intellectual function and other cognitive skills,
leading to a decline in the ability to perform activities of daily living. Id. at 357.
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lives as well as the sense of shame that may accompany plenary
guardianship. For these elderly a limited guardian is the
analogue to a physical caretaker. The older individuals receive
just that degree of help that is needed. They are also spared being
told by a judge that they are no longer autonomous, but rather,
incapacitated, with no more legal rights than people in comas.
For the elderly, limited guardianship is to plenary guardianship
what an assisted-living facility is to a nursing home. It offers the
proper balance of care and protection with dignity and autonomy.
Despite the attraction of limited guardianship in theory, the
difficulty of tailoring the power of the limited guardian to the
needs of the older person is sometimes cited as a serious
impediment to its adoption.52 That objection rings true if each
court attempts to craft a unique, limited guardianship for each
older ward who has limited capacity. To do so, the court would
have to make detailed findings about the mental condition and
capabilities of the potential ward, 3 which would require a timeconsuming process both in the fact-finding stage and in the
drafting of the order of guardianship. But this need not be the
case.
Although guardianship orders never should become "off-theshelf' standardized, "one size fits all" orders, they need not be
handcrafted. The goal should be sufficient individualization to
meet the degree of help needed by the elderly person, blended
with the efficiencies gained using semi-standard court orders
based on a limited number of categories of limited guardianship
not unlike the federal classification of Medigap54 plans into ten
standardized plans. A court could create modules of limited
guardianship, though not as inflexible or detailed as the Medigap
program. In turn, guardianship petitioners could request a form
of guardianship relief consistent with the preexisting modules
and ask for any modifications deemed necessary because of the
condition and needs of the incapacitated elderly person. Such a
system also could inform petitioners about the proof of incapacity
they will need to justify the appointment of a limited guardian
with the requested powers. Armed with the knowledge of the
universe of possible limited guardianship orders, the petitioner

52.
53.
20 Pa.
54.

Fell, supran. 9, at 203.
Of course, some states require such findings even for plenary guardianships. E.g.
Consol. Stat. § 5511 (West 1975 & Supp. 2001).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395a, 1395b-2, 1395ss (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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and the court could engage in an efficient hearing. The petitioner
would know what evidence to present, while the court would
know what order to issue as the proper response.
Still, the appointment of a limited guardian, although
desirable, is not enough. The appointing court cannot merely
appoint a guardian and proceed institutionally to "forget" about
the incapacitated individual. Rather, the court must monitor the
guardianship. It must oversee the acts of the guardian to ensure
that the guardian is complying with the terms of the limited
guardianship." Just as monitoring of a plenary guardian by the
use of mandatory reports and field inspections by court visitors is
essential if courts are to fulfill their function as the protector of
the mentally incapacitated, 6 so too must courts accept that it is
their unique duty to see that the limited guardian acts according
to the court order and in the best interests of the incapacitated
person. The court also must be ready to amend or expand the
powers of the limited guardian in response to the changing needs
and conditions of the incapacitated person. If the courts fail in
this critical role, then guardianship reform will be little more
than a charade. Guardianship will be a world of court orders
without compliance, paper reforms without reality, and a smug,
self-satisfied system that turns a blind eye to the needs of the
mentally incapacitated. Yet, it need not be so. Courts can and
must monitor guardians and aggressively seek the resources
necessary to support the effective oversight of guardians and the
protection of persons adjudicated mentally incapacitated.
Assuming that courts and reformers indeed create a
workable system of limited guardianship, in many cases, limited
guardianship could be voluntary.57 The elderly person might be
aware of his or her limitations and welcome the opportunity to
turn over part of his or her life to a guardian, comforted by the
promise of court supervision and knowing that, if his or her
capacity should decline, further protection will be present in the
form of a trusted guardian whose powers the court can expand if
necessary. If the older person acceded to the imposition of a
limited guardian, the process could proceed more quickly, at less
cost, and without the acrimony that can accompany plenary

55. Fell, supra n. 9, at 203.
56. Id. at 197.
57. The Uniform Probate Code provides for consensual guardianship. Unif. Prob. Code
§ 5-303, 8 U.LA. 357 (1998).
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guardianship. A compliant ward who understood and agreed with
the need for assistance in the form of a guardian with limited
powers, would convert guardianship from a "solution" imposed on
the individual to a cooperative arrangement in which the court,
the petitioner and, most importantly, the elderly person, together
could create a limited guardianship that assists rather than
oppresses.
Whether imposed or consensual, the greater use of limited
guardianship would be in accord with the expressed intent of
many reformed guardianship statutes." If nothing else, having
guardianship practice in compliance with the law is desirable.
Otherwise, the stated custom of many statutes for a preference
for limited guardianship 9 is little more than false advertising.
Although the initial lack of use of limited guardianship in the
years after the adoption of reformed guardianship could be
attributed to the natural difficulty of instituting the new,
unknown, and unusual, with the passage of years, it becomes less
defensible to ignore the statutorily-stated preference for limited
guardianship. If judges and lawyers do not really have any
confidence in limited guardianship, then reformers should just
admit that it was an idea whose time was never to come, amend
the statutes by making limited guardianship a possible, but not
preferred, outcome, and turn our attention to other guardianship
60
concerns, such as how to supervise guardians properly.
Reformers should also admit that limited guardianship is not
a solution to all the problems of guardianship. It will not make
guardianship hearings less expensive or less time-consuming. It
will not stop relatives from fighting about the need for a guardian, even about a guardian with limited authority. And, because of
the limits on the guardian's authority, limited guardianship creates the distinct possibility of future hearings to provide judicial
clarification and amendment of the powers of the guardian.

58. E.g. Fla. Stat. § 744.344(2) (2001) (directing the courts to order the least restrictive
alternative); N.Y. Mental Hyg. Laws § 81.02(a)(2) (providing that the powers granted to a
guardian "shall constitute the least restrictive form of intervention"). The Uniform

Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act provides that a court "shall grant to a
guardian only those powers necessitated by the ward's limitations and demonstrated
needs. Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proc. Act § 311(b), 8A U.LA. 146 (Supp. 2001).
59. Leary, supra n. 8, at 264.
60. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Paula Hannaford, The National Probate Court
Standards:The Role of the Courts in Guardianshipand Conservatorship Proceedings, 2
Elder L.J. 147 (1994) (discussing supervision of guardians).
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Indeed, the difficulties of limited guardianship seem so well
known or so real that they appear to have created an
insurmountable obstacle to its adoption.61 Unfortunately, these
practical problems, these "real world" concerns, have triumphed
over the "softer" values of personal autonomy, dignity,
independence, and respect for individual freedom. For some
reason, a complaint, such as that limited guardianship will
require too much judicial time, seems more compelling than the
importance of helping older persons retain their sense of selfrespect while providing them with the assistance they need.
Complaints about limited guardianship miss the point.
Instead of asking what limited guardianship will do to the
guardianship system, society needs to ask what the guardianship
system is doing to the elderly. The burden should not be on
limited guardianship to prove its worth. Instead, the proponents
of plenary guardianship should bear the burden of defending it.
Consider the present system of plenary guardianship with its
attendant costs, court proceedings, family squabbles, shortage of
guardians, ill-prepared and unsupervised guardians, and lack of
protection for wards; the list goes on and on. Yet, those who
advocate limited guardianship continue to bear the burden to
"prove" it will work or to demonstrate solutions to any and all
objections. It need not be so. Of course, the widespread use of
limited guardianship will be beset with problems. But so is the
present world of plenary guardianship. The only way to create a
workable system of limited guardianship is to put it into effect
and address the problems as they arise. "Life in all its fullness
must supply the answer... .."

If limited guardianship were to be widely used, one can
predict many benefits, but the fundamental attraction would be
how it would change the relationship between the guardian and
the ward. Limited guardianship will make it more obvious to
guardians that they must take into account the wishes and wants
of the ward who, after all, will remain in charge of many aspects
of his or her life. A guardian acting under a limited guardianship
often will need to consult and compromise with the ward as the
61. Fell, supra n. 9, at 203.
62. Welch v. Helvering,290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). When the issue before the Supreme
Court was the definition of "ordinary and necessary" business expenses for tax purposes,
Justice Benjamin Cardozo resisted laying down a bright-line test. Rather, he concluded,
"The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is a way of life. Life in all its
fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." Id.
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two of them attempt to act in concert to maintain and improve
the ward's quality of life. And, although much is not known as to
how limited guardianship would play out day to day, limited
guardianship has the potential to change the relationship
between the guardian and the ward from one of command and
dominance to one of negotiation and compromise.
IV. WILL JUDGES USE LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP?
So how does society advance to this brave new world of
limited guardianship? Judges and judicial attitudes are the keys.
Certainly, no reform of guardianship will have much success
unless the judges are supportive, and that, in turn, depends on
judges being assured that they will have the time and resources
to make limited guardianship successful. Judges do not live in the
theoretical land of law reviews in which hope and idealism rule,
and reality is often far removed. Because they preside in a world
of real courts, real incapacitated persons, and real costs, their
enthusiasm for guardianship reform is necessarily tempered by
concern that proposed reforms are not only desirable, but also
feasible. Judges are all too aware of the difficulty of translating a
statute from the code book to the courtroom. For example, if
judges are expected to appoint guardians with limited powers,
then judges will need court investigators to help them understand
the needs and capabilities of the alleged incapacitated person.'
For that matter, judges need court investigators to alert them to
instances in which the alleged incapacitated person might be a
candidate for limited guardianship. Of course, the petitioner and
the lawyer for the alleged incapacitated person (assuming there is
one) should be capable of informing the court as to when a limited
guardianship might be appropriate. But that model, the pure
adversarial model with the court as the passive adjudicator, is not
appropriate for guardianship hearings in which the court is
supposed to promote the best interests of the ward. The ward's
best interests may or may not be best advocated by the petitioner
or even by counsel for the alleged incapacitated person. 64 Judges
63. Fell, supra n. 9, at 210.
64. See Alfreida B. Kenny, Is Article 81 the AppropriateVehicle to Address the Needs of
the Mentally Ill? 125 (P.L.I. N.Y. Prac. Skills Course Handbook Series, Guardianship Law,
Aug. 21, 2001) (available in Westlaw at 106 PLI/NY 103) (reminding lawyers that so long
as the client understands the consequences, a lawyer may not substitute his or her own
judgment for that of the client, even if the lawyer believes the client is not acting in his or
her own best interest).
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need independent sources of information about the mental,
physical, and economic conditions of the alleged incapacitated
person if they are to employ limited guardianship successfully.
Limited guardianship also requires post-guardianship monitoring
for the court to know whether the guardian is carrying out the
prescribed level of duties and whether the powers granted to the
guardian are sufficient to protect the interests of the ward.
Expecting courts to oversee guardians and, in particular,
limited guardians, may not be realistic because it is asking an
adjudicatory body to perform a supervisory function. Courts and
judges are very skilled at finding facts, deciding cases, and
creating remedies, but they are neither trained, nor do they have
the staff support, to monitor the post-trial actions of the parties.'
Normally, courts expect that the opposing party will have an
interest in ensuring that judicial orders are carried out. But in
guardianship, there may be no "opposing party" who can
complain to the court if the guardian acts improperly. Although
the ward has the right to inform or petition the court, 6 in most
instances the reduced capacity of the ward makes the exercise of
that right unlikely. Interested third parties, such as relatives,
friends, or service providers, may seek out court help for wards
whom they believe are not being properly cared for by the
guardian,67 but such intervention will not always occur. Rather, it
is necessarily up to the courts, meaning the judges, to supervise
guardians and guardianships and see that the interests of the
ward are properly protected.68 To perform this function, the courts
must be funded adequately so that they can hire investigators
and skilled personnel to direct the investigators.
Providing judges with the level of financial support required
to institute, operate, and maintain a limited guardianship system
is a necessary component, but is relatively useless unless judges
understand and appreciate the potential advantages of limited

65. See generally Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, GuardianAccountability Then
and Now: Tracing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 867 (2002)

(discussing the problems associated with courts acting as guardianship monitors,
surveying various state attempts to solve these problems, and offering recommendations
for reform).
66. E.g. Fla. Stat. § 744.3715 (2001) (providing that "any interested person, including
the ward," may request the court to review the order of guardianship on the ground that
the guardian is not acting in the best interests of the ward).
67. E.g. id.
68. Fell, supran. 9, at 203, 210.
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guardianship. One reason that limited guardianship is used so
infrequently is that judges do not perceive that its advantages
outweigh its drawbacks.6 9 If judges really accepted the superiority
of limited guardianship over plenary guardianship, there would
be no need for essays such as this that extol its virtues. What is
needed is judicial education about the benefits to wards of the
greater use of limited guardianship, for it is, after all, the welfare
of wards with which the judges are most concerned. Once the
judges are won over, and once they believe they will have the
resources to manage a limited guardianship system successfully,
they will have little difficulty persuading attorneys who engage in
guardianship practice to appreciate the advantages of limited

guardianship.
Judges, then, are the key to the adoption of limited
guardianship. How to educate them about the virtues of limited
guardianship and how it might be successfully implemented
should be the next steps. The answers to those questions will be
found among the judges who must perceive that they can be the
creators of a limited guardianship system and thus invested with
the desire that it succeed. State-by-state, judicial conferences
must convene and address the whys and hows of limited
guardianship and create action plans for its adoption. There must
be specific plans for monitoring guardians, both limited and
plenary, with realistic cost estimates. It is pointless to claim that
the guardianship system is "reformed" unless judges institute
formal systems to fulfill their oversight function.
Finally, those who finance the courts must be persuaded of
the need for adequate funding. Courts require not great sums, but
critical dollars, if limited guardianship is to work and if the
dignity and autonomy of the elderly are to be respected. With a
judicial commitment and adequate funding, limited guardianship
finally will move from the land of the ideal to the real world of the
elderly with diminished capacity who are in need of help, but not
at the cost of their personal freedom.

69. Id. at 202 (discussing perceived drawbacks to limited guardianship).

